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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is strong evidence from cross-country studies for a positive correlation between measures 
of women’s empowerment and other dimensions of human development (McGillivray, 2005), a 
correlation that is driven by causal effects in both directions (Doepke et al., 2012).1 In this sense, 
the empowerment of women is an integral part of the development process. Correspondingly, one 
of the Millennium Development Goals is to ‘promote gender equality and empower women,’ while 
one of the Sustainable Development Goals is to ‘achieve gender equality and empower all women 
and girls.’ However, progress towards these goals has been slow: according to the United Nations, 
‘Gender inequality persists and women continue to face discrimination in access to education, 
work and economic assets’ (www.un.org/millenniumgoals/gender.shtml). 
Rappaport (1984) observes that, ‘Empowerment is viewed as process: the mechanism by 
which people… gain mastery over their lives. However, the content of the process is of infinite 
variety.’ While cross-country studies provide evidence for broad trends, country-specific studies 
can do justice to the variety to which Rappaport alludes. In this paper, we use survey data from 
rural Senegal to model the effects on married women’s wellbeing of their level of empowerment. 
Our key measure of empowerment is motivated by ethnographic research which implies that for 
women in Senegal, empowerment is closely tied to the opportunity to spend time outside the home. 
Our data reveal substantial variation in the empowerment of women,2 and we find the effect of this 
variation on women’s wellbeing to be large when compared with the direct effects of more 
                                                          
1 This positive correlation is not a foregone conclusion. For example, the economic empowerment of wives may 
give husbands an incentive to step up the use of domestic violence in order to retain the balance of power in the 
household; see for example Chin (2012). 
2 This variation is consistent with the finding that although Senegal has a legal code that is intended to enhance 
women’s empowerment, Senegalese husbands often ignore formal legal prescriptions relating to marriage 
contracts (Aldashev et al., 2012). 
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traditional development indicators such as household income. On average, the probability of poor 
wellbeing outcomes for the least empowered women is about 30 percentage points higher than the 
probability for the most empowered. This result suggests that women’s empowerment is important 
not only in its own right but also as a determinant of other development outcomes, and that the 
effect of development policy will depend crucially on the interaction of empowerment with other 
dimensions of development. The next section reviews the literature on women’s empowerment 
and wellbeing; this is followed by a discussion of the data, and then the statistical model. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing literature on women’s empowerment and wellbeing comprises several different types 
of study that use different measures of empowerment and different empirical methods. Firstly, 
some studies (which we designate ‘type-1’) use household survey data to measure the effect of 
natural experiments involving shocks that ought to raise the proportion of household income or 
wealth that is under women’s control, or to raise their degree of control. Here, the key dimension 
of empowerment is control over economic resources, and the key dimensions of wellbeing are the 
consumption, health and education of the women or their children, there being some evidence that 
women value children’s consumption more highly than do men. Examples of such natural 
experiments include changes in marriage or inheritance laws (Deininger et al., 2013; Rangel, 2006) 
and shocks to gender-specific income (Duflo, 2003; Qian, 2008); all of these authors find results 
implying that empowerment improves outcomes for women and/or children. Other authors find 
similar results by using Instrumental Variables estimators to analyze changes in conditions which 
affect control over resources but which might not be exogenous (Doss, 2001; Duflo and Udry, 
2004). Correspondingly, field studies involving gender-specific cash transfer programs show that 
transfers to women are more beneficial to children, on average, than are transfers to men (Behrman 
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and Hoddinott, 2005; Bobonis, 2009; Lim et al., 2010; Maluccio and Flores, 2005). 
In type-1 studies, empowerment is viewed in terms of control over economic resources, 
and changes in the level of control are not observed directly, but assumed to be correlated with a 
certain type of economic shock. There is another type of study (which we designate ‘type-2’) in 
which empowerment is viewed more broadly (not just in terms of economic resources) and 
measured more directly. Such studies use survey data on women’s decision-making power within 
the home in order to estimate the effect of empowerment. In the surveys, respondents – either 
husbands or wives, or both – indicate who has a say in a range of household choices, for example 
decisions about household purchases, or whether the wife goes to seek formal healthcare, or 
whether she is allowed to make visits to her relatives. Women are taken to be most empowered 
when they make these decisions alone, and least empowered when their husband makes these 
decisions alone. Several authors (for example Allendorf, 2007, 2010; Furuta and Salway, 2006; 
Lépine and Ströbl, 2013; Maitra, 2004; Mistry et al., 2009) report evidence that these indicators 
of empowerment are positively correlated with health outcomes such as access to antenatal care, 
delivery of children in hospital, child nutrition, or vaccination against common infectious diseases. 
A related literature (‘type-3’) incorporates a wider range of outcomes but focuses on a particular 
correlate of empowerment: the incidence of domestic violence. Here, there is strong evidence that 
violence leads to poor outcomes, whether the outcome is a specific physical health characteristic 
(Dunkle et al., 2004; Miner et al., 2011) or mental health and subjective wellbeing (see the survey 
by Golding, 1999). 
 In addition to these quantitative studies, there is also an ethnographic literature on women’s 
empowerment. Of particular relevance to this paper is Perry (2005), who reports the results of 
fieldwork in rural Senegal. Perry documents a trend towards greater empowerment resulting from 
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the Senegalese structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s. Structural adjustment led 
to a removal of agricultural subsidies received by male household heads. This reduced their income 
relative to that of women in the household who were entitled to farm a certain amount of land 
independently, but who never received any subsidies. The subsequent rise in many women’s intra-
household bargaining power was used to secure the right to travel alone to local markets and trade 
independently, raising women’s income and bargaining power even further. Conversations with 
both men and women suggest that the women benefitting most from this process have been those 
with the poorest husbands, and there is substantial inter-household variation in the degree of 
women’s self-perceived empowerment.  
 In this paper we investigate the effects of women’s empowerment in rural Senegal using a 
method similar to that of the type-2 studies, with an analysis of household survey data that includes 
both measures of empowerment and other characteristics of the women surveyed. However, our 
study incorporates the following novel characteristics. 
(i) Our dependant variables are measures of self-reported wellbeing which are broader in 
scope than the specific epidemiological variables used in type-2 studies. (These broader 
outcomes do sometimes feature in type-3 studies, but type-3 studies focus exclusively 
on domestic violence.) 
(ii) Among our explanatory variables, we compare measures of empowerment typical of 
type-2 studies with a simple alternative measure that can be interpreted in terms of the 
Senegal-specific observations of Perry (2005). We also compare these measures with 
another alternative that is not based on the woman’s self-reported level of 
empowerment. 
(iii) Almost all type-2 studies assume that empowerment is independent of wellbeing; we 
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investigate whether our results are robust to the relaxation of this assumption. 
The next section discusses the data used to construct our empowerment and wellbeing measures. 
 
3. THE DATA 
Our data come from the Senegalese household survey documented by Lépine (2009) and Lépine 
and Ströbl (2013). This survey, conducted in May 2009 by a team of trained local interviewers 
speaking the local languages (Wolof and Fula), incorporates 990 men and 1,158 women living in 
505 subsistence farming households in 39 villages located in the Senegal River valley in the north 
of the country. (The age of majority in Senegal is 18. Girls are allowed to marry at the age of 16, 
and the survey also includes 105 girls of marriageable age; boys of this age cannot marry.) The 
number of adults in each household ranges from two to 13; the households were randomly selected, 
but all adults and married girls in the selected households were surveyed. Many households 
constitute an extended family group of three generations, including both single adults and those 
who are married. Many marriages are polygamous – husbands have up to three wives – so the 
sample of married women has a nested structure: individuals within marital units (women with the 
same husband) within households within villages. 
873 women and girls in the sample are married; our hypotheses concern the population of 
wives, so our data analysis excludes the unmarried women and unmarried girls of marriageable 
age. Of these 390 unmarried individuals, 89 are widows (of whom only six are below the age of 
50) and 271 are never-married. The average age of those who are never-married is 21, and only 
six women over the age of 40 are never-married: while marriage can be delayed, it is virtually 
inevitable. 28 women are divorced or separated, and two women did not report their marital status. 
The sample villages are located in the same general area as the villages sampled by Gaspart and 
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Platteau (2010) in order to study the economics of bride-price.3 In their sample, 20% of marriages 
end in divorce (usually instigated by the woman, who returns to her parents), while in the sample 
used here only 3% of ever-married women are unmarried and divorced at the time of the survey. 
This suggests that while divorcing one’s husband is a realistic option (at least for some women), 
is it very rare for a divorcee to remain single. 
Our main results pertain to the wives in the sample who are married and living either with 
their husband, or, if the husband is not living at home – for example, if he is working in the city – 
with a household head who is a male blood relative of the husband and who stands in the husband’s 
place while he is away from home. (There are 691 such wives, of whom 627 gave answers to all 
of the relevant survey questions, a response rate of 91%.) However, the online appendix includes 
robustness tests using a sample that incorporates the other wives, who are living with their own 
blood relatives. 58% of wives in the sample are Wolof and 40% are Fula; all of the women in each 
household are of a single ethnicity. There are some ethnically mixed marriages, but these account 
for only 1% of the wives in the sample. There is also a high degree of religious homogeneity: 95% 
of the wives are Tijani, with the remaining 5% split equally between Mourides and Qadiris. These 
percentages also apply to the sample of all adults.4,5 
                                                          
3 The payment of bride-price is ubiquitous in this part of Senegal. In the Gaspart-Platteau sample, the average 
bride-price is FCFA 40,000, while in the sample used here the geometric mean of annual per capita household 
income is FCFA 100,000, so the price of the average bride is neither trivial nor astronomical. The bride-price is 
returned to the husband in the event of divorce. Roughly half of the marriages in the Gaspart-Platteau sample 
are arranged by the parents and half are love matches. 
4 If one includes dummy variables for mixed marriages and religious affiliation in the regression equations 
discussed below, the corresponding coefficients are never significantly different from zero. 
5 In Senegal as a whole, 43% of the population are Wolof and 24% are Fula; 60% of the population are Tijani, 
28% are Mouride, and 6% are Qadiri. Given the under-representation of minority groups in the sample, our 
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 A distinctive characteristic of the survey is that it includes both questions about women’s 
empowerment and questions about subjective wellbeing. This permits the construction of the 
following variables. 
 
(i) Subjective measures of wellbeing. In the pilot study on which the survey was based, two health 
issues were especially salient for farmers. Firstly, they raised the issue of bodily pain (and more 
specifically back pain). Secondly, there were high reported levels of stress and anxiety relating to 
uncertainty about the success of harvests and the need to take out loans to buy agricultural inputs. 
Consequently, all wives in the survey were asked the following two questions about their 
wellbeing: Do you feel anxious or depressed? Do you suffer from bodily pains? The possible 
responses to these questions are: ‘often’ / ‘rarely’ / ‘never’. The proportion of wives answering 
‘never’ to these questions is only about 10%, so for each wife we construct two binary variables 
as follows: 
 
• Anxiety equals one if the response to the anxiety question is ‘often’, and zero otherwise. 
• Pain equals one if the response to the physical pain question is ‘often’, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
The anxiety question is similar to question 6 in the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression 
Questionnaire (CES-D), and to the second of the two questions in the Patient Health Questionnaire 
(PHQ-2), which has been validated in a rural African context similar ours (Monahan et al., 2007).6 
In other parts of Africa, responses to questions about bodily pain in longitudinal samples have 
been shown to be strongly correlated over time with a range of physical health outcomes, including 
                                                          
results should be seen as describing the characteristics of the two main ethnic groups (i.e. the Wolof and Fula) 
and the main religious group (i.e. the Tijanis). 
6 Further, Wilk and Bolton (2002) provide evidence that the concept of depression is salient in an African context. 
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fatigue and nausea (Fox et al., 2010; Rosen et al., 2014); there is a similarly strong cross-sectional 
correlation (Tolla, 2006). We therefore have some confidence that in our sample the responses to 
the anxiety and pain questions capture a large part of the variation in wives’ mental and physical 
wellbeing. Nevertheless, we will compare our results for anxiety and pain with results using a 
third wellbeing measure based on responses to a question asking wives to rate their own general 
health on a 1-10 scale, with 10 representing the best health. The use of a visual analog scale is a 
common technique in evaluating health status, and is employed in standardized health status 
instruments such as EQ-5D. Moreover, Macia et al. (2012, 2015) show that in another Senegalese 
sample, responses based on a five-point scale for general health are strongly correlated with 
responses to other health questions, and to questions about general life satisfaction.7 The third 
wellbeing measure, designated health-score, is a transformation of wives’ responses to the general 
health question so that a score of 10 represents the poorest health: in this way, all three measures 
are decreasing in the wellbeing of the respondent. 
Table I reports descriptive statistics for the three wellbeing outcomes: the mean and 
standard deviation of health-score and the fraction of anxiety and pain responses equal to one. 
These statistics are reported for the sample of 627 cohabiting wives for whom both the wellbeing 
outcomes and the covariates discussed below are reported,8 and separately for the wives for whom 
only the wellbeing variables (and not the covariates) are reported. It can be seen that the wives in 
the sample are roughly evenly split between those who are often anxious or depressed (anxiety = 
                                                          
7 In addition, the meta-analysis of Subramanian et al. (2010) indicates that the visual analog scale performs well 
in studies similar to ours. As shown in the online appendix, subjective wellbeing in our sample is strongly 
correlated with objective health characteristics. 
8 Two wives answered all of the relevant survey questions except those corresponding to anxiety and pain, so 
for health-score the sample is 629. 
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1) and those who are not, and between those who often experience bodily pain (pain = 1) and those 
who are not; the standard deviation of health-score is about twice as large as its mean. In this 
sense, there is substantial variation in the level of wives’ wellbeing. The table also reports statistics 
for the larger sample of wives, including those not cohabiting. There do not appear to be any 
substantial differences in the descriptive statistics across the different samples. Table II reports 
Spearman rank-order correlations coefficients and ordinary correlations for the different wellbeing 
outcomes.9 These are large and significantly greater than zero, but also significantly less than one, 
so the three outcomes seem to represent connected but distinct dimensions of the wives’ wellbeing. 
 
(ii) Measures of empowerment. Our first survey question relating to empowerment is motivated by 
the ethnographic observations of Perry (2005), which stress the significance of a wife’s ability to 
engage in separate, gendered spheres of production: cultivating land allocated specifically to her 
and taking the crops to market. Even if a wife does have such land, her independence depends on 
the ability to leave the home when necessary.10 The first empowerment question we use is: Can 
you go out without the permission of your husband? The possible responses to this question are: 
‘yes’ / ‘it depends’ / ‘no’. Only 7% of women answered ‘yes’, so we aggregate the first two 
categories as follows: 
 
• Freedom equals one if the response is ‘yes’ or ‘it depends’, and zero otherwise. 
Our second survey measure utilizes a series of questions which were based on those of 
                                                          
9 These are for the sample of cohabiting wives. 
10 An alternative measure might be the total amount of time the wife spends cultivating and marketing her own 
crops. However, we contend that empowerment depends on when the wife is able to leave the home, and not just 
on the total amount of time she is permitted to spend away. The simple freedom question captures her ability to 
make an economically important decision. 
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Allendorf (2007): Who makes decisions concerning your health? Who makes decisions concerning 
daily expenditures? Who makes decisions concerning large expenditures? Who makes decisions 
concerning family visits? The alternative responses to this question are: ‘me’ / ‘my husband’ / ‘me 
and my husband’ / ‘someone else’. The correlations between the responses to these questions are 
very high. If one constructs a set of binary variables equal to one if the response is ‘me’ and equal 
to zero otherwise, the first principal component of the four variables (with weights of 0.55, 0.56, 
0.50 and 0.35) explains 50% of their overall variation. Performing the same exercise for the 
response ‘me and my husband’, the first principal component of the four variables (with weights 
of 0.51, 0.52, 0.50 and 0.47) explains 47% of their overall variation. Therefore, we summarize the 
four sets of responses by adding together the four binary variables for ‘me’ and the four binary 
variables for ‘me and my husband’. The resulting empowerment measures, designated decisions-
1 and decisions-2 respectively, have a maximum value of four and a minimum value of zero. The 
questions on which the decisions variables are based are common in the type-2 studies discussed 
above, and Lépine and Ströbl (2013) find that an empowerment index incorporating responses to 
such questions is a significant predictor of child nutrition in Senegal. Unlike freedom, the 
decisions variables lack a direct interpretation connected to Senegalese ethnography, but we 
include them in order to see whether their significance in type-2 studies (including Lépine and 
Ströbl) can be replicated in our study of broader measures of wellbeing. 
 Both the freedom and decisions variables are based on the wife’s own responses to the 
interviewer’s questions. Given the concern that these responses might be influenced by the 
husband (or other male relative, if the husband was not living at home), the interviewer recorded 
the husband’s (or other relative’s) role and demeanour during the wife’s interview. One use for 
this record, in addition to exploring the candour of the wives’ responses, is as a direct measure of 
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empowerment. The interviewer asked to speak to the wife alone, and in some cases the husband 
agreed to this. In other cases the husband insisted on being present at the interview but remained 
passive. Finally, there were some cases in which the husband verbally intervened in the interview. 
This final category constitutes only 10% of cases, so we construct a bivalent variable as follows: 
 
• Absent equals one if the husband (or other male relative) was absent from the interview, 
and zero otherwise. 
 
Absent is an alternative measure of the incidence of independent action by the wife.11 Results using 
a trivalent variable are available on request, and are similar to those reported below. We take a 
higher value of absent to indicate that the husband (or other relative) is less inclined to monitor 
and control the wife’s behaviour. 
Descriptive statistics for the empowerment variables appear in Table I, which shows that 
the sample is roughly equally divided between those who have some freedom to leave the home 
(freedom = 1) and those who do not, and that about two thirds of husbands were absent from the 
interview (absent = 1). As shown in Table II, the freedom and decisions variables are quite highly 
correlated: the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients are large and significantly greater than 
zero. However, these variables are not strongly correlated with absent: the Spearman rank-order 
correlation coefficients all close to zero and statistically insignificant. One possible explanation 
                                                          
11 One reason why there could be some measurement error in absent is that the opportunity cost of the husband’s 
time varies across households. Some husbands may just be too busy to attend the interview. However, adding 
an interaction term between absent and the husband’s level of education or household income does not produce 
a significant coefficient in our regression equations, so such measurement error is unlikely to be a major concern. 
It is also possible that the husband’s behaviour affects the wife’s responses to the questions on which the 
variables freedom and decisions are based. If this is this case, and if empowerment affects wellbeing, then we 
should find that the interaction terms absent  freedom and absent  decisions are significant explanatory 
variables in the wellbeing regressions. This turns out not to be the case. 
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for the lack of correlation is that that absent = 1 indicates a high level of trust between husband 
and wife that is consistent either with gender equality or with a reliably submissive wife. Table II 
also shows that there are significant negative correlations between all of the (inverse) wellbeing 
measures and all of the empowerment measures, except for an insignificant correlation between 
health-score and absent. It remains to be seen whether this positive association between wellbeing 
and empowerment remains when we control for other determinants of wellbeing. 
 
(iii) Other individual-specific covariates of wellbeing. Wellbeing could also depend on a wife’s 
age, education or ethnicity, on whether she is in a polygamous marriage, or on whether she is 
married to the household head.12 From responses to other survey questions we construct the 
following variables: 
 
• Age is the wife’s age in years. 
• Writing equals one if the woman can write a letter in French (the business language of 
Senegal), and zero otherwise. There are also data on the woman’s highest level of school 
enrolment, and it makes little difference which of the two measures of education is used. 
• Polygamous equals one if the wife is in a polygamous marriage, and zero otherwise. 
• In-law equals one if the woman is married to a male relative of the household head, and 
zero if she is married to the household head. 
• Fula equals one if the woman Fula (39% of the sample), and equals zero otherwise.  
• Other equals one if the woman is neither Wolof nor Fula (2% of the sample), and equals 
zero otherwise. 
 
                                                          
12 There is also information about the seniority of each wife in the polygamous marriages, but adding a seniority 
variable to the wellbeing regression does not produce a significant coefficient, and has no noticeable effect on 
the size or significance levels of the other variables. 
13 
 
Since 99% of households are ethnically homogeneous, the ethnicity variables could also be 
regarded as household characteristics. Further analysis in the online appendix shows that the results 
for empowerment and wellbeing discussed below are robust to the inclusion of a larger set of 
individual-specific covariates. 
 
(iv) Household- and village-level covariates of wellbeing. 
Besides the individual responses, the survey also contains information about household 
characteristics provided by the household head. This allows us to measure household size and 
income, both of which have been found to affect individual wellbeing in other developing countries 
(Das et al., 2008). It is also possible that wellbeing depends on the ease of access to informal social 
support networks and formal medical services, and these can be measured at the village level. 
Therefore, our model also includes the following covariates: 
 
• Income is the log of total annual household income per adult, measured in CFA Francs. 
 • Adults equals the number of adults in the household. 
• Dist-hospital is the distance from the village to the nearest hospital, measured in 
kilometres. 
• Social is a village-level measure of a woman’s access to informal support networks. Every 
woman in the survey is asked how her last healthcare expenditure was financed. For just 
over half of the women, the household is wealthy enough or the expenditure is small 
enough so that the expenditure can be financed out of pocket (or, in a few cases, by health 
insurance). However, for some women the health expenditure is a source of financial 
distress, in the sense that they have to rely on the financial support of friends or family 
outside the household (5% of the sample) or of a community group or tontine (8% of the 
sample). In the absence of such support, the healthcare expenditure is financed by the sale 
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of property (29% of the sample). Our measure of the strength of village-level social support 
networks is the ratio of the number of cases in which financial support is provided to the 
total number of cases of distress (with either financial support or the sale of property). This 
second measure is denoted social.13  
 
Sample statistics for all of the covariates appear in Table I.  
 
[Tables I-II here] 
 
4. MODELLING THE DETERMINANTS OF SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING 
The data have a nested structure (individuals within marital units within households within 
villages), so one can in principle fit hierarchical models of wellbeing with parameters that capture 
the magnitude of the unobserved heterogeneity at each level of aggregation. However, preliminary 
estimation of hierarchical models indicates that the only significant unobserved heterogeneity is at 
the household level, so the results presented below are based on random-effects regressions for 
individuals within households. 
For the binary wellbeing measures anxiety and pain our estimates are based on probit 
models of the following form: 
 
     2P 1 , , ~ N ,         i j jk ikkanxiety x i j             (1) 
                                                          
13 One potential concern about social is that it could be correlated with the size of healthcare expenses, which 
may also be correlated with the dependant variables. The survey includes data on the size of the last healthcare 
expenditure in CFA Francs, so it is possible to address this concern directly. It turns out that healthcare cost is 
significantly correlated with social. However, conditional on the other explanatory variables in the model, 
healthcare cost is not significantly correlated with the dependent variables. (In a large proportion of cases, the 
illness in question is not the woman’s illness, and even when it is, the cost of travel, consultation and medicine 
appears not to be strongly correlated with the severity of the illness.) 
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     2P 1 , , ~ N ,         i j jk ikkpain x i j             (2) 
 
For the health-score our estimates are based on a tobit model: 
 
   2 2, , ~ N , , ~ N 0,             i j i j ik ikky x i j            (3) 
  max 1, min 10,i ihealth score y  
      
Here, (.) is the cumulative normal density function, the ,  and  terms are parameters to be 
estimated, and xik is the value of the k 
th explanatory variable for the i th woman. The terms  j,  j and 
 j capture unobserved heterogeneity in the jth household.  
 Panel A(i) of Table III includes the estimated values of the  parameters in equation (1), 
panel A(ii) includes the estimated values of the  parameters in equation (2), and panel A(iii) 
includes the estimated values of the  parameters in equation (3). Each panel includes estimates of 
the within-household error correlation (). The table also shows the implied marginal effects for 
unit changes in x (P / x | x = 1), evaluated at the mean value of P, along with the relevant t-
ratios. The three panels show some similarity in the estimated effects of the empowerment 
variables across the three wellbeing measures. In particular, there is a significant association with 
freedom, but the only significant decisions effect is with decisions-1 in the health-score model.14 
Because of the high correlation between freedom and decisions, the t-ratio on the decisions 
coefficients could be biased downwards. For this reason, Table III also includes versions of each 
model in which either freedom or the decisions variables are excluded: these are reported in the B 
and C panels. It turns out that the exclusion the decisions variables does not make a large difference 
                                                          
14 This result is unchanged if the decisions variables are replaced by their four component indicators. 
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to the coefficient and t-ratio on freedom. However, the exclusion of freedom substantially 
increases the size of the estimated decisions-1 effects in the anxiety and health-score models, and 
in the anxiety model the effect is now significant at the 5% level. 
  The negative and significant coefficients on freedom indicate that more freedom to leave 
the home is associated with greater wellbeing. When freedom = 1, the probability of a wife often 
feeling anxious or depressed is about 12 percentage points lower than when freedom = 0. The 
probability of her often having bodily pains is about 16 percentage points lower, and the health-
score variable is improved by about half a point (in other words, by one third of a standard 
deviation). When freedom is excluded from the model, the estimated decisions-1 coefficients 
imply that a one point improvement in this variable on its four-point scale reduces the probability 
of a wife often feeling anxious or depressed by about seven percentage points, and improves the 
health-score variable by about 0.3 points. Overall, there is some evidence that freedom is a better 
measure of empowerment in the models of anxiety and pain. Nevertheless, the significance of 
decisions-1 in some of the Table III models suggests that the dimensions of empowerment which 
predict specific health outcomes in type-2 studies are also relevant to more general measures of 
wellbeing. 
 Table III also shows that absent is a significant correlate of wellbeing as measured by 
anxiety and pain (but not by health-score). As noted above, absent represents a dimension of 
women’s empowerment that is quite distinct from freedom and decisions. If the husband was 
absent from the interview then the probability of the wife often feeling anxious or depressed is 
about 18 percentage points lower and the probability of her often having bodily pains is about 16 
percentage points lower. Since freedom and absent are not highly correlated, there are many cases 
in which freedom = absent = 1, and others in which freedom = absent = 0. The coefficients in 
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Table III imply that in the latter case the probability of often feeling anxious or depressed (or of 
often feeling bodily pains) is around 30 percentage points higher than in the former. 
 Among the other explanatory variables, income, writing, adults, in-law and social are 
never significant at the 5% level. However, age has a consistent effect across all three models: an 
extra year of age adds about one percentage point to the probability of feeling anxious or depressed, 
or of feeling bodily pains, and worsens the health score by about 0.04 points.15 The positive and 
significant coefficients on the Fula ethnicity variable suggest that Fula women have lower levels 
of wellbeing, on average, than Wolof women. An extra kilometre of distance between the village 
and the nearest hospital increases the probability of a woman often having bodily pains by about 
half a percentage point, but has no significant effect on the other two wellbeing variables. The 
probability of often having bodily pains is about 11 percentage points lower for wives in 
polygamous marriages, but polygamy has no significant effect on the other two wellbeing 
variables. 
 When all other covariates are excluded from the regression equations, the estimated 
coefficients on freedom and absent are very similar to the ones reported in Table III. This suggests 
that the effect of empowerment on wellbeing is not through these other covariates. 
[Table III here] 
 
 One potential concern with the results in Table III is that empowerment, education and 
income might be endogenous to empowerment. In online appendix we present Instrumental 
Variables estimates that allow for such endogeneity, using distance to the nearest high school and 
information on agricultural productivity shocks as instruments for education and income, and 
                                                          
15 Adding (age)2 to the model produces a coefficient that is insignificantly different from zero.  
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village-level ethnic diversity variables as instruments for empowerment (following Lépine and 
Ströbl, 2013). The IV estimates of the effects of freedom and absent on the wellbeing variables 
are almost identical to those in Table III, which suggests that the endogeneity of empowerment is 
not a serious concern in this context. Moreover, while social is not a significant determinant of 
wellbeing (conditional on other individual, household and village characteristics), it is a significant 
determinant of absent (with a positive effect). This suggests that the strength of village-level social 
support networks has an indirect effect on a wife’s wellbeing. 
 One question that we have not addressed directly relates to the proximate determinants of 
wellbeing. If a wife has the freedom to leave the home without her husband’s permission, in what 
ways does her quality of life improve so that she reports a higher level of subjective wellbeing?  
There are a number of possible channels through which this freedom could influence wellbeing, 
including (i) a greater control over the household’s total resources, and (ii) better treatment by the 
husband as a consequence of the wife’s greater bargaining power (including a lower incidence of 
domestic violence). The question of domestic violence was too sensitive to raise in the survey, but 
there is one survey question relating to the wife’s control or influence over household resource 
allocation. The question is: What share of the household’s consumption do you control? The 
alternative responses to this question are: ‘none’ / ‘less than half’ / ‘half’ / ‘more than half’.16 From 
these responses we construct the ordinal variable control, which is measured on a 0-3 scale, the 
lowest point corresponding to ‘none’. Table I includes sample statistics for control, while Table II 
includes correlation coefficients between this variable and the different measures of empowerment 
and wellbeing. Control is significantly positively correlated with freedom and the decisions 
variables: in other words, there is some association between empowerment and the wife’s control 
                                                          
16 No wife answered ‘all’. 
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of resources. However, there is no significant correlation between any of the wellbeing variables 
and control: in other words, the wife’s control of resources is not generally associated with 
wellbeing as we have measured it. This implies that control of consumption is not the main channel 
through which empowerment influences wives’ wellbeing, and that some other channel (perhaps 
better general treatment by the husband as a consequence of greater bargaining power) is 
important. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Analysis of survey data from rural Senegal indicates that the effects of women’s empowerment on 
their subjective wellbeing are large. A wife’s education and the income level of her household 
have no significant effect on her wellbeing, but a wife who cannot leave the house without her 
husband’s permission, or cannot speak to an interviewer unless he is present, is much more likely 
to report a poor level of mental and physical health. This evidence complements existing work on 
the factors that drive variation in levels of empowerment (for example, De Hoop et al., 2014), and 
suggests that empowerment should receive at least as much attention as more traditional 
development goals.  
The significance of empowerment here is consistent with other studies, which show that 
empowerment is associated with better access to medical care and better health outcomes for their 
children. The insignificance of household income is more surprising, and one might suspect that 
this is explained by a low correlation between household income and the resources available to a 
wife. This would be the case if, for example, few women had any control over household resources 
and positive shocks to household income were associated only with higher consumption by men. 
However, it also appears that in our sample, even though the wife’s degree of control over 
household consumption is significantly correlated with our measures of empowerment, it is not 
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significantly  correlated with her self-reported wellbeing. An alternative explanation may lie with 
the sentiments expressed by Wolof women to Perry (2005): 
‘Although her husband is the richest man in the village, Ndey proclaimed that she would rather be 
in her sister’s marriage to a poor farmer than in her own to a rich man. Another woman observed, 
“Those without money [are] the ones who take best care of their wives.”’  
 
Perry also notes that low household income is viewed as a legitimate reason for a wife to return to 
her parents and seek a divorce. These social conventions may mean that there is unobserved 
heterogeneity in husbands’ behaviour which is correlated with household income: higher income 
is associated with a greater sense of entitlement on the part of the husband and worse treatment of 
his wife/wives, offsetting any benefit to the wife/wives through higher consumption. In our sample 
there is no significant correlation between women’s empowerment and household income,17 so the 
variation in the quality marital relationship would have to be in some dimension other than 
empowerment. This is a subject for further study. 
 The evidence presented here stands at odds with the cross-country evidence for a positive 
correlation between empowerment and per capita income (Doepke et al., 2012). One possible 
explanation for the difference is that the cross-country variation in both income and empowerment 
is much greater than the within-country variation, and that with sufficiently large changes a 
positive association can be expected to appear. However, cross-country studies abstract from 
country-level heterogeneity that may make the association stronger or weaker. It cannot be 
assumed that economic development (narrowly defined) will inevitably lead to improvements in 
women’s empowerment and wellbeing, and there is some reason to suppose that our findings may 
                                                          
17 The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients are 0.01 for income and freedom, 0.07 for income and 
decisions-1, and -0.02 for income and absent. 
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apply to a wider range of countries. Senegal is a country in which modernization has led to some 
challenging of the traditional values that limit female empowerment, but these traditions are still 
highly persistent, especially in rural areas, leading to substantial inter-household variation in 
attitudes towards empowerment. Evidence from a wide range of countries points to the persistence 
of cultural traditions alongside modernization (Inglehart and Baker, 2000), so the patterns 
observed in Senegal may well appear elsewhere. In this case, the effective development policy will 
require robust individual-level measures of empowerment and wellbeing independently from 
economic outcomes, with policy interventions targeted explicitly at these outcomes. 
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TABLE I 
Descriptive statistics 
          
continuous and  
count variables 
cohabiting wives  
(covariates reported) 
all wives 
(covariates reported) 
cohabiting wives 
(covariates not reported) 
              N mean  s.d.              N mean  s.d.               N mean  s.d. 
health-score 629 3.09 1.60 756 3.17 1.63 47 3.09 1.43 
decisions-1 629 0.57 0.90 756 0.67 1.03    
decisions-2 629 1.11 1.18 756 1.05 1.18    
control 614 0.86 0.86 741 0.86 0.90    
age 629 37.9 11.3 756 38.1 12.1    
income 629 11.5 0.93 756 11.5 0.95    
adults 629 5.05 2.35 756 5.11 2.38    
dist-hospital 629 20.1 11.2 756 20.0 11.2    
social 629 0.34 0.23 756 0.35 0.24    
          
binary 
variables 
cohabiting wives  
(covariates reported) 
all wives 
(covariates reported) 
cohabiting wives 
(covariates not reported) 
 N proportion = 1 N proportion = 1 N proportion = 1 
anxiety 627 0.41 752 0.41 46 0.43 
pain 627 0.46 751 0.46 45 0.42 
freedom 629 0.49 756 0.49    
absent 629 0.69 756 0.73    
writing 629 0.22 756 0.23    
polygamous 629 0.32 756 0.27    
in-law 629 0.23 756 0.19    
Fula 629 0.40 756 0.40    
other 629 0.02 756 0.02    
jewel 629 0.50 756 0.49    
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TABLE II 
Correlation coefficients 
 
Spearman rank-order correlations 
 health-score anxiety pain freedom absent decisions-1 decisions-2 control 
anxiety  0.30***       
 
pain  0.38*** 0.49***      
 
freedom -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.18***     
 
absent -0.05*** -0.22*** -0.18***  0.07***    
 
decisions-1 -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.09***  0.40*** -0.02***   
 
decisions-2 -0.04***  0.01*** -0.03***  0.31***  0.02***  0.01***  
 
control -0.01*** -0.03*** -0.03***  0.15***  0.01***  0.24***  0.25***  
 
Simple correlations 
 health-score anxiety pain freedom absent decisions-1 decisions-2 control 
anxiety  0.30***        
pain  0.39***  0.49***       
freedom -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.18***      
absent -0.05*** -0.22*** -0.18***  0.07***     
decisions-1 -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.05***  0.38***  0.01***    
decisions-2 -0.02***  0.01*** -0.03***  0.27***  0.05*** -0.07***   
control  0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01***  0.08*** -0.02***  0.21***  0.15***  
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10 
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TABLE III 
Random-effects estimates of the determinants of wellbeing (m.e. = marginal effects; t-ratios are in italics) 
 dependent variable = anxiety: probit 
 
dependent variable = pain: probit 
 
d.v. = health-score: tobit 
 A(i)  B(i)  C(i)  A(ii)  B(ii)  C(ii)  A(iii)  B(iii)  C(iii) 
 coef. m.e. 
 coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef.  coef.  coef. 
freedom -0.400 -0.124  -0.475 -0.147     -0.502 -0.158  -0.544 -0.171     -0.421  -0.585    
-1.82   -2.36      -2.53   -3.09      -2.62  -4.06   
decisions-1 -0.135 -0.042     -0.209 -0.065  -0.035 -0.011     -0.130 -0.041  -0.211    -0.289  
-1.27      -2.07   -0.34      -1.37   -2.63    -3.86 
decisions-2 0.009 0.003     -0.037 -0.011  -0.036 -0.011     -0.097 -0.031  -0.041    -0.090 
 0.12      -0.50   -0.52      -1.45   -0.70    -1.60 
absent -0.587 -0.182  -0.591 -0.183  -0.591 -0.184  -0.489 -0.154  -0.494 -0.156  -0.505 -0.160  0.101  0.101  0.091  
-3.08   -3.05   -3.06   -2.71   -2.73   -2.74   0.69  0.69  0.62 
age 0.033 0.010  0.032 0.010  0.033 0.010  0.042 0.013  0.042 0.013  0.043 0.014  0.042  0.040  0.043  
3.57   3.50   3.55   4.93   4.97   4.92   6.51  6.20  6.57 
income -0.083 -0.026  -0.091 -0.028  -0.065 -0.020  0.084 0.027  0.084 0.027  0.108 0.034  -0.011  -0.027  0.007  
-0.82   -0.89   -0.64   0.89   0.89   1.12   -0.14  -0.33  0.09 
writing 0.098 0.030  0.101 0.031  0.073 0.023  0.056 0.018  0.055 0.017  0.028 0.009  -0.107  -0.101  -0.134  
0.48   0.49   0.35   0.29   0.28   0.14   -0.69  -0.65  -0.86 
adults -0.045 -0.014  -0.045 -0.014  -0.035 -0.011  -0.029 -0.009  -0.030 -0.009  -0.017 -0.005  0.023  0.023  0.032  
-0.90   -0.88   -0.70   -0.63   -0.65   -0.37   0.64  0.64  0.87 
polygamous -0.027 -0.008  -0.020 -0.006  -0.051 -0.016  -0.341 -0.107  -0.336 -0.106  -0.373 -0.118  -0.189  -0.179  -0.208 
 -0.13   -0.09   -0.24   -1.80   -1.78   -1.92   -1.17  -1.11  -1.28 
in-law -0.363 -0.112  -0.361 -0.112  -0.365 -0.114  -0.183 -0.058  -0.154 -0.048  -0.189 -0.060  -0.264  -0.261  -0.250  
-1.47   -1.44   -1.47   -0.79   -0.67   -0.80   -1.37  -1.36  -1.30 
Fula 0.412 0.128  0.442 0.137  0.541 0.169  0.438 0.138  0.438 0.138  0.606 0.192  0.421  0.416  0.552  
1.85   1.95   2.53   2.26   2.27   3.09   2.66  2.64  3.62 
other -0.381 -0.118  -0.391 -0.121  -0.416 -0.130  -0.491 -0.154  -0.487 -0.153  -0.536 -0.170  -1.467  -1.468  -1.497  
-0.53   -0.53   -0.58   -0.84   -0.82   -0.91   -2.62  -2.61  -2.63 
social -0.342 -0.106  -0.355 -0.110  -0.333 -0.104  0.051 0.016  0.039 0.012  0.052 0.017  -0.525  -0.548  -0.515  
-0.82   -0.83   -0.78   0.14   0.11   0.14   -1.69  -1.76  -1.63 
dist-hospital 0.004 0.001  0.005 0.001  0.008 0.003  0.018 0.006  0.018 0.006  0.023 0.007  -0.004  -0.005  0.000  
0.47   0.48   0.88   1.91   1.90   2.43   -0.61  -0.66  -0.06 
 0.578 0.179  0.595 0.184  0.590 0.184  0.509 0.160  0.513 0.162  0.529 0.168  0.312  0.308  0.338 
 6.23   6.52   6.38   5.22   5.34   5.50   5.01  4.89  5.60 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1: Fitting the Wellbeing Models to the Sample of All Wives 
Table A1 shows the results of fitting the models of anxiety, pain and health-score to the full 
sample of wives, including those who are not cohabiting. (The relevant descriptive statistics for 
the full sample appear in Table I of the main text.) There is one additional explanatory variable: 
wife-of-head = 1 if the wife is married to the household head, and zero otherwise. Comparing 
Table A1 with Table III of the main text, it can be seen that including wives who are not cohabiting 
in the sample makes little difference to the results. The estimated effects of freedom in the anxiety 
and pain models, of absent in the pain model, and of decisions-1 in the health-score model are 
all slightly smaller in Table A1 than in Table III, but still all significant at the 5% level. Other 
effects of empowerment are virtually identical in the two tables. 
 
Appendix 2: Allowing for the Endogeneity of Empowerment, Consumption and Education 
It is possible that consumption and education are endogenous to wellbeing, because wellbeing 
affects a woman’s cognitive ability and labour productivity. It is also possible that the level of 
empowerment is endogenous. Wellbeing might affect a woman’s ability to negotiate with her 
husband; it might also affect her choice of husband and therefore the magnitude of the difference 
between spouse preferences and the extent to which the husband feels the need to impose his will 
on her. In order to control for endogeneity, we can fit a first-stage model of the empowerment, 
consumption and education variables conditional on a set of instruments excluded from the second-
stage wellbeing model. We will discuss the first-stage model, and then explain how controlling for 
endogeneity changes the results of the wellbeing model. The following results are based on a model 
corresponding to the B columns in Table III, excluding the decisions variables. 
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Instruments for empowerment, income and education 
The instruments for empowerment are based on previous work in Senegal which suggests a link 
between ethnic diversity at the village level and a lower prevalence of traditional social attitudes 
(Bernard et al., 2008; Lépine and Ströbl, 2013).18 First of all, we note that there is substantial 
variation in the ethnic composition of the villages in the sample: seven are entirely Wolof, 20 are 
entirely Fula, and twelve are mixed. (Ten out of the twelve mixed villages have a Wolof majority; 
the two with a Fula majority are very small. Wolof villages tend to be larger on average, and Wolof 
women make up 60% of the total sample.19) This variation in the level of ethnic diversity arises 
from the migration patterns of Fula nomads in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – until then, 
the Senegal River valley was populated only by Wolof. Some of the immigrant Fula created their 
own new villages, but others were welcomed into existing Wolof villages. Since then, there has 
been virtually no inter-village migration, and all of the Fula household heads in the survey stated 
that their land had been in the family for several generations. For this reason, the ethnic 
composition of each village can be treated as an exogenous variable.  
Secondly, building on Lépine and Ströbl (2013), we note that Fula women living in Wolof-
majority villages may have a higher level of empowerment than women in Fula-only villages, 
because women who are part of an ethnic minority are less influenced by the social norms 
associated with their traditional culture. In this case, Fula women in Wolof-majority villages 
should exhibit higher levels of freedom on average, so our first variable is constructed as follows: 
• Fula-minority equals one if the woman is Fula (or of other non-Wolof ethnicity) and 
living in a Wolof-majority village, and equals zero otherwise. 
                                                          
18 This correlation is consistent with evidence from natural experiments that exposure to ethnic diversity leads 
to more favourable attitudes towards women’s empowerment (Clingingsmith et al., 2009). 
19 Village size is not a significant determinant of wellbeing. 
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Possibly Fula women in Fula-majority villages also differ from those in Fula-only villages, but the 
Fula-majority sample is too small to test this.  
Finally, we construct a variable to capture the effect of the ethnic mix of the village on the 
extent of traditional social pressure on Wolof women. It is very rare for a married Wolof woman 
to live in a Fula-majority village, and the second variable reflects this asymmetry. We hypothesize 
that Wolof women in villages with some Fula presence are less subject to traditional social 
pressure, and construct the following measure: 
 
• Wolof-share equals the fraction of Fula in the village if the woman is Wolof, and equals 
zero otherwise.20  
Descriptive statistics for Fula-minority and Wolof-share appear in Table A2. We anticipate that 
larger values of either variable will both be associated with a higher probability of freedom = 1. 
However, they may also be associated with a lower probability of absent = 1, because a husband 
might tend to trust his wife less if she is under less outside pressure to conform to traditional social 
norms.21  
Using Fula-minority and Wolof-share as instruments implies an exclusion restriction: 
conditional on the other variables in the wellbeing model, the ethnic composition of a woman’s 
village is assumed to have no direct impact on her wellbeing. In this context, it is important to 
remember that the wellbeing model includes variables that capture both the woman’s own ethnicity 
(Fula and other) and the level of social support for women of that ethnicity in the village (social). 
                                                          
20 The upper 95th percentile of the distribution of this fraction is 0.25. There are just a handful of observations 
between 0.25 and 0.99 (reflecting the rarity mentioned in the previous paragraph), but these observations make 
the distribution highly skewed. The Wolof-share measure used in the results reported here is trimmed at 0.25. 
21 Fula-minority and Wolof-share are not very highly correlated: the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient 
is –0.24. 
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In fact, both Fula-minority and Wolof-share are significantly correlated with social (p < 0.01), 
but this does not mean that the exclusion restriction is violated, even if wellbeing does depend 
directly on the level of social support, because social is included in the second-stage model.  
Household consumption may also be endogenous to wellbeing, because consumption 
depends on income, income depends on the wife’s labour productivity, and productivity depends 
on wellbeing. Our instrument for income is based on an income shock that occurred in the year of 
the survey. Civil engineering work in the area of the survey led to salt contamination in the water 
used to irrigate some farms, and these farms suffered unusually low productivity levels in the 
survey year. Our instrument is as follows:  
 
• Salt equals one if the farm was affected by salt contamination, and zero otherwise. 
 
Our instrument for writing is based on the proximity of the village to the nearest high school. High 
school education has been an option for the youngest women in the survey, but distances to the 
school range between zero (when there is a school in the village) and 50km. The instrument is as 
follows:  
 
• Dist-lycee is the distance from the village to the nearest high school, measured in 
kilometres, if the woman is aged 25 or under, and equals zero otherwise.22 
 
Identification of the effect of writing on wellbeing relies on an exclusion restriction: conditional 
on the other variables in the wellbeing model, distance to the nearest high school affects wellbeing 
only through its effect on education. Distance to the high school is correlated with distance to other 
amenities, but recall that the second-stage model also includes dist-hospital. Conditional on the 
                                                          
22 It does not matter whether the model also includes an indicator variable for whether the woman is aged 25 or 
under. In both the wellbeing models and the writing model, the point estimate of the coefficient on this indicator 
variable is very close to zero, and the corresponding t-ratio is less than 0.1. 
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distance to healthcare amenities, it is unlikely that the distance to school has a direct effect on 
wellbeing.23 
In order to show that the variables Fula-minority, Wolof-share, salt and dist-lycee are 
strong instruments, Table A3 includes reduced-form models of the four endogenous regressors. 
For freedom, absent and writing, these are random-effects probit models:24 
 
     2P 1 , , ~ N ,i j jk ikkfreedom z i j                    (A1) 
 
     2P 1 , , ~ N ,i j jk ikkintervene z i j                   (A2) 
 
     2P 1 , , ~ N ,i j jk ikkwriting z i j                   (A3) 
 
Here, the ,  and  terms are parameters to be estimated, and zik is the value of the kth explanatory 
variable for the i th woman. The terms  j,  j and  j capture unobserved heterogeneity in the jth 
household. For the household-level variable income, a least-squares model is used: 
 
 2~ N ,       j j jk jkkincome z            (A4) 
 
Here, zjk stands for the household average value of zik and the  terms are parameters to be 
estimated. 
The parameter values in Table A3 should be interpreted with some caution, since they 
represent reduced-form estimates. Nevertheless, we can see that the coefficient on Fula-minority 
is significant at the 1% level in the freedom equation, while the coefficient on Wolof-share is 
                                                          
23 Adding a variable capturing the distance to the nearest clinic makes no substantial difference to our results. 
24 Equations (A1-A3) can also be fitted simultaneously using a multivariate probit model. However, the error 
terms in such a model have correlations that are very close to zero and statistically insignificant. 
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significant at the 5% level in the absent equation. As anticipated, the first of these coefficients is 
positive and the second is negative: ethnic diversity is associated with more cases of freedom = 1 
but fewer cases of absent = 1. Also as anticipated, there are negative and significant coefficients 
on dist-lycee in the writing equation and on salt in the income equation. Across the four equations, 
the four instruments are jointly significant at the 5% level. Another interesting feature of Table A3 
is that higher values of social are associated with a significantly higher expected of absent. In a 
village with a maximal value of social = 1, the probability that absent = 1 is about 36 percentage 
points higher than a village in which social = 0. This suggests that better social support networks 
are associated with less frequent monitoring of the wife’s behaviour by the husband. This is 
consistent with De Hoop et al. (2014), who find that support networks raise empowerment in a 
sample of Indian women. Even if these networks have no significant direct effect on wellbeing, 
they can still have an indirect effect. 
 
The wellbeing model 
We have three binary endogenous regressors and one continuous endogenous regressor. In order 
to control for endogeneity in the wellbeing models, we adapt the method outlined in Arendt and 
Holm (2006). First of all, we fit probit models of freedom, absent and writing, plus a least-squares 
model of income. Then the parameters in the probit / tobit models of the wellbeing variables are 
estimated using the fitted values from the income equation in place of the observed values of 
income, and adding the three Inverse Mills ratios from the first-stage probit models (denoted  
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freedom,   absent, and   writing).25 Standard errors on the parameters are estimated using a bootstrap.26 
Table A4 reports the results for each of the three wellbeing models. 
 The use of instrumental variables does reduce the precision of the parameter estimates in 
Table A4, and the only explanatory variables associated with significant effects are freedom, 
absent and age. Nevertheless, all of the empowerment effects that are significant at the 5% level 
in Table III remain so in Table A4: freedom and absent in the anxiety and pain models and 
freedom in the health-score model. The corresponding marginal effects in Table A4 are very 
similar to those in Table II, showing that greater empowerment leads to a substantial improvement 
in wellbeing.  
 
Appendix 3: Additional Determinants of Wellbeing 
From the results so far, it is unclear whether empowerment influences subjective wellbeing 
through an effect on the woman’s physical health, or rather that empowerment influences 
subjective wellbeing independently of the woman’s physical health. One way to see whether 
empowerment influences wellbeing through a woman’s physical health is to add measures of 
physical health status to the wellbeing models. If the main channel for the empowerment effect is 
through physical health, then the addition of these measures should substantially reduce the 
                                                          
25 If there were significant correlations between the error terms in the first-stage probit models, then the 
correction for endogeneity here would be rather more complex. However, as noted in footnote 22, these 
correlations are very close to zero. 
26 There is a concern that in a Heckman-type model, any correlation between the household random effects and 
the individual-level explanatory variables will lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. However, as suggested 
by Zabel (1992), conditioning all of the regression equations on the mean values of individual characteristics 
can remove this correlation and mitigate the biases that would otherwise arise. When these mean values are 
added to the regression equations, the results are similar to those reported in Tables A3-A4. 
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coefficients on freedom and absent. For this reason, Table A5 shows the results from a set of 
extended models that include the following individual characteristics:  
 
• Dif-walk equals one if the wife can walk five kilometres (but not easily), and equals zero 
otherwise. 
• Not-walk equals one if the wife cannot walk five kilometres, and equals zero otherwise. 
• Illness equals one if the wife suffers from a chronic illness, and zero otherwise. 
• Kids indicates how many children (aged under 18) the wife has.27 
 
Relevant descriptive statistics for these variables appear in Table A2. The results in Table A5 
should be treated with some caution, since we do not have any instruments to control for the 
endogeneity of these variables. Nevertheless, comparison of Tables III and A5 provide some 
indication of whether the empowerment effect operates through a physical health channel. 
The estimated coefficients on freedom and absent in Table A5 are very similar to those in 
Table III. In other words, the effect of empowerment on subjective wellbeing is not accounted for 
by an association between empowerment and physical health. Rather, for a given level of physical 
health, empowerment improves the woman’s mental health and her own estimate of her wellbeing. 
This result is consistent with the fact that freedom and absent are not significantly correlated with 
dif-walk, not-walk, illness or kids.  
Nevertheless, Table A5 shows that better physical health is associated with improvements 
in all dimensions of subjective wellbeing. There are significant positive coefficients on dif-walk, 
not-walk and illness in all three wellbeing models. If these are interpreted as causal effects, then 
                                                          
27 It is also possible to include the total number of children in the household as an extra explanatory variable, 
and kids interacted with in-law and polygamy. The coefficients on these variables are never significantly 
different from zero. 
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having a chronic illness adds about 20 percentage points to the probability that a woman will often 
feel anxious or depressed and 15 percentage points to the probability that she often feels bodily 
pains; it worsens her subjective health score by about one point. The effects of not being able to 
walk five kilometres (compared with being able to walk this distance easily) are slightly larger. 
However, the number of children has a significant effect only in the pain model, an extra child 
raising the probability that pain = 1 by about two percentage points. Note also that the marginal 
effects for easily-walk and illness are of a similar magnitude to those for freedom and absent: 
roughly speaking, the effect on subjective wellbeing of having a high level of freedom and absent 
is similar to the effect of being able to walk a reasonable distance and being free from chronic 
illness. Moreover, since the coefficients on income and writing are statistically insignificant and 
close to zero, there is some reason to think that empowerment matters more for wellbeing than 
income and education. 
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TABLE A1 
Random-effects estimates of the determinants of wellbeing including wives not cohabiting (m.e. = marginal effects; t-ratios are in italics) 
 dependent variable = anxiety: probit 
 
dependent variable = pain: probit 
 
d.v. = health-score: tobit 
 A(i)  B(i)  C(i)  A(ii)  B(ii)  C(ii)  A(iii)  B(iii)  C(iii) 
 coef. m.e. 
 coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef.  coef.  coef. 
freedom -0.387 -0.119  -0.445 -0.137     -0.348 -0.110  -0.432 -0.136     -0.432  -0.558    
-2.00   -2.52      -2.05   -2.85      -2.95  -4.21   
decisions-1 -0.121 -0.037     -0.193 -0.060  -0.024 -0.008   0.000  -0.078 -0.025  -0.129    -0.195  
-1.41      -2.38   -0.31      -1.08   -1.96    -3.15 
decisions-2 -0.005 -0.001     -0.043 -0.013  -0.080 -0.025   0.000  -0.119 -0.038  -0.058    -0.105 
 -0.06      -0.64   -1.31      -2.04   -1.07    -2.03 
absent -0.602 -0.185  -0.611 -0.188  -0.611 -0.189  -0.416 -0.131  -0.419 -0.131  -0.423 -0.134  0.104  0.092  0.091  
-3.31   -3.33   -3.32   -2.49   -2.53   -2.51   0.73  0.65  0.64 
age 0.036 0.011  0.035 0.011  0.036 0.011  0.045 0.014  0.046 0.014  0.046 0.014  0.049  0.047  0.049  
4.70   4.81   4.63   6.27   6.62   6.30   9.25  9.66  9.31 
income -0.107 -0.033  -0.113 -0.035  -0.093 -0.029  0.031 0.010  0.022 0.007  0.042 0.013  -0.034  -0.020  -0.022  
-1.10   -1.15   -0.95   0.36   0.26   0.48   -0.46  -0.27  -0.30 
writing 0.071 0.022  0.130 0.040  0.049 0.015  -0.022 -0.007  -0.005 -0.002  -0.022 -0.007  -0.204  -0.203  -0.211  
0.40   0.74   0.28   -0.13   -0.03   -0.13   -1.45  -1.46  -1.49 
adults -0.053 -0.016  -0.046 -0.014  -0.044 -0.014  -0.023 -0.007  -0.030 -0.009  -0.017 -0.005  0.011  0.018  0.019 
 
-1.19   -1.02   -0.99   -0.63   -0.82   -0.46   0.34  0.55  0.56 
polygamous -0.054 -0.017  -0.046 -0.014  -0.076 -0.024  -0.389 -0.123  -0.371 -0.116  -0.407 -0.129  -0.197  -0.209  -0.214 
 -0.26   -0.22   -0.37   -2.12   -2.05   -2.19   -1.24  -1.30  -1.34 
wife-of-head -0.093 -0.029  -0.048 -0.015  -0.089 -0.028  -0.017 -0.005  -0.020 -0.006  -0.028 -0.009  -0.381  -0.291  -0.395 
 -0.44   -0.23   -0.42   -0.08   -0.10   -0.14   -2.19  -1.78  -2.27 
in-law -0.390 -0.120  -0.360 -0.111  -0.385 -0.119  -0.146 -0.046  -0.090 -0.028  -0.151 -0.048  -0.581  -0.482  -0.582  
-1.59   -1.49   -1.54   -0.62   -0.40   -0.64   -2.96  -2.56  -2.96 
Fula 0.442 0.136  0.429 0.132  0.549 0.170  0.533 0.168  0.521 0.163  0.643 0.204  0.379  0.382  0.509  
2.20   2.12   2.83   3.12   3.14   3.87   2.62  2.63  3.61 
other -0.663 -0.204  -0.699 -0.215  -0.678 -0.210  -0.368 -0.116  -0.459 -0.144  -0.373 -0.118  -1.639  -1.811  -1.636  
-0.95   -0.96   -0.97   -0.70   -0.95   -0.71   -3.19  -3.57  -3.13 
social -0.287 -0.088  -0.345 -0.106  -0.285 -0.088  0.012 0.004  -0.017 -0.005  0.011 0.004  -0.390  -0.358  -0.383  
-0.73   -0.87   -0.71   0.04   -0.05   0.04   -1.39  -1.26  -1.34 
dist-hospital 0.007 0.002  0.006 0.002  0.011 0.003  0.019 0.006  0.018 0.006  0.023 0.007  -0.001  -0.002  0.003  
0.77   0.65   1.21   2.31   2.29   2.80   -0.15  -0.28  0.51 
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TABLE A1 (continued) 
 dependent variable = anxiety: probit  dependent variable = pain: probit  d.v. = health-score: tobit 
 A(i)  B(i)  C(i)  A(ii)  B(ii)  C(ii)  A(iii)  B(iii)  C(iii) 
 coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef.  coef.  coef. 
 0.587 0.181  0.601 0.185  0.599 0.185  0.478 0.151  0.468 0.147  0.485 0.154  0.289  0.319  0.315 
 7.59   8.08   7.86   5.63   5.57   5.71   5.30  6.09  5.92 
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TABLE A2  
Additional descriptive statistics 
       
continuous and  
count variables 
cohabiting wives  
(covariates reported) 
all wives 
(covariates reported) 
              N mean  s.d.              N mean  s.d. 
Wolof-share 629 0.04 0.09 756 0.05 0.10 
dist-lycee 629 3.03 8.38 756 3.27 8.72 
kids 629 2.51 1.91 756 2.27 1.90 
       
binary 
variables 
cohabiting wives  
(covariates reported) 
all wives 
(covariates reported) 
 N proportion = 1 N proportion = 1 
Fula-minority 629 0.07 756 0.06 
salt 620 0.01 745 0.01 
dif-walk 628 0.31 755 0.30 
not-walk 628 0.14 755 0.14 
illness 626 0.24 753 0.24 
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TABLE A3 
Models of the endogenous regressors (m.e. = marginal effects; t-ratios are in italics) 
 dependent variable 
= freedom: probit 
 dependent variable 
= absent: probit 
 dependent variable 
= writing: probit 
 dependent variable 
= income: OLS 
 
     
 coef. m.e. 
 coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.   coef.   
age 0.014 0.002  -0.022 -0.005  -0.057 -0.014   -0.002    
0.83   -1.85   -5.91    -0.48   
adults -0.116 -0.014  -0.061 -0.012  0.056 0.014   -0.106    
-1.08   -0.87   1.74    -6.51   
polygamous 0.110 0.013  0.169 0.034  -0.211 -0.052   0.001   
 0.25   0.54   -1.29    0.02   
in-law -0.003 0.000  1.582 0.320  0.105 0.026   -0.077    
-0.01   3.96   0.58    -0.77   
Fula -3.734 -0.443  -1.179 -0.239  -0.480 -0.118   -0.459    
-5.62   -3.02   -2.95    -5.64   
other -1.058 -0.126  -0.631 -0.128  -0.166 -0.041   -0.232    
-0.63   -0.59   -0.31    -0.80   
social 1.071 0.127  1.786 0.362  0.635 0.156   -0.709    
1.10   2.53   2.17    -4.82   
dist-hospital -0.109 -0.013  -0.037 -0.008  -0.004 -0.001   0.014    
-4.44   -2.53   -0.67    4.31   
Fula-minority 3.902 0.463  -0.868 -0.176  -0.278 -0.068   0.080    
3.80   -1.40   -0.81    0.51   
Wolof-share 2.888 0.342  -4.633 -0.938  -0.275 -0.067   -2.755    
0.79   -1.99   -0.26    -5.04   
salt 0.929 0.110  0.511 0.103  0.742 0.182   -1.674    
0.67   0.51   1.71    -3.98   
dist-lycee -0.037 -0.004  -0.026 -0.005  -0.019 -0.005   -0.003    
-1.65   -1.89   -2.30    -0.67   
 0.923 0.109  0.797 0.161  0.105 0.026      
 42.54   13.16   0.88       
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TABLE A4 
Instrumental variable estimates (m.e. = marginal effects; t-ratios are in italics) 
  
dependent variable 
= anxiety: probit 
 
dependent variable 
= pain: probit 
 
d.v. = health-
score: tobit 
 
     
 
 
coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.   coef. 
  
freedom  -0.461 -0.141  -0.542 -0.169   -0.498    
 -2.13   -2.86    -3.44   
absent  -0.612 -0.187  -0.500 -0.156   0.127    
 -2.77   -2.53    0.85   
age  0.080 0.025  0.095 0.030   0.067    
 2.06   2.36    1.99   
income  0.469 0.143  0.654 0.204   0.288    
 0.83   1.00    0.48   
writing  0.071 0.022  0.077 0.024   -0.106    
 0.31   0.38    -0.60   
adults  -0.054 -0.017  -0.027 -0.008   0.000    
 -0.51   -0.23    0.00   
polygamous  0.207 0.063  -0.163 -0.051   0.018   
  0.58   -0.44    0.06   
in-law  -0.178 -0.054  -0.072 -0.022   -0.113    
 -0.43   -0.18    -0.33   
Fula  0.553 0.169  0.694 0.216   0.144    
 0.90   1.11    0.30   
other  -0.519 -0.159  0.361 0.112   -1.036    
 -0.47   0.34    -1.33   
social  -0.286 -0.087  0.043 0.013   -0.233    
 -0.40   0.05    -0.36   
dist-hospital  -0.017 -0.005  0.003 0.001   -0.029    
 -0.68   0.11    -1.33   
 freedom  0.178 0.055  0.147 0.046   0.222    
 0.82   0.69    1.21   
 absent  0.525 0.161  0.168 0.052   0.564    
 0.81   0.28    1.12   
 writing  -1.202 -0.368  -1.226 -0.382   -0.690    
 -1.29   -1.21    -0.79   
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TABLE A5 
Random-effects estimates of the determinants of wellbeing with additional controls (m.e. = marginal effects; t-ratios are in italics) 
 dependent variable = anxiety: probit 
 
dependent variable = pain: probit 
 
d.v. = health-score: tobit 
 A(i)  B(i)  C(i)  A(ii)  B(ii)  C(ii)  A(iii)  B(iii)  C(iii) 
 coef. m.e. 
 coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef.  coef.  coef. 
freedom -0.466 -0.133  -0.512 -0.145     -0.518 -0.144  -0.541 -0.151     -0.430  -0.558    
-2.03   -2.45      -2.61   -3.18      -2.91  -4.20   
decisions-1 -0.113 -0.032     -0.199 -0.058  -0.010 -0.003     -0.108 -0.031  -0.174    -0.252  
-1.01      -1.91   -0.10      -1.20   -2.36    -3.64 
decisions-2 0.042 0.012     -0.010 -0.003  -0.034 -0.009     -0.096 -0.027  -0.026    -0.076 
 0.52      -0.14   -0.47      -1.40   -0.48    -1.46 
absent -0.704 -0.200  -0.708 -0.201  -0.704 -0.203  -0.698 -0.195  -0.703 -0.196  -0.703 -0.198  -0.009  -0.011  -0.019  
-3.41   -3.38   -3.41   -3.76   -3.78   -3.73   -0.07  -0.08  -0.14 
age 0.026 0.008  0.026 0.007  0.027 0.008  0.033 0.009  0.033 0.009  0.034 0.009  0.024  0.022  0.025  
2.65   2.57   2.66   3.74   3.76   3.78   3.82  3.50  3.87 
income -0.075 -0.021  -0.082 -0.023  -0.058 -0.017  0.110 0.031  0.111 0.031  0.132 0.037  0.029  0.016  0.047  
-0.70   -0.75   -0.54   1.14   1.16   1.34   0.38  0.22  0.62 
writing 0.094 0.027  0.098 0.028  0.069 0.020  0.028 0.008  0.027 0.007  0.000 0.000  -0.157  -0.154  -0.183  
0.44   0.45   0.32   0.14   0.13   0.00   -1.10  -1.07  -1.28 
adults -0.037 -0.011  -0.036 -0.010  -0.027 -0.008  -0.032 -0.009  -0.033 -0.009  -0.020 -0.006  0.025  0.025  0.034 
 
-0.71   -0.68   -0.52   -0.69   -0.71   -0.45   0.74  0.75  1.00 
polygamous -0.008 -0.002  -0.008 -0.002  -0.027 -0.008  -0.296 -0.082  -0.292 -0.081  -0.325 -0.092  -0.182  -0.177  -0.200 
 -0.04   -0.04   -0.12   -1.56   -1.53   -1.68   -1.22  -1.17  -1.32 
in-law -0.286 -0.081  -0.306 -0.087  -0.274 -0.079  -0.017 -0.005  0.010 0.003  -0.017 -0.005  -0.257  -0.261  -0.244  
-1.09   -1.14   -1.04   -0.07   0.04   -0.07   -1.40  -1.44  -1.33 
Fula 0.329 0.094  0.367 0.104  0.470 0.136  0.315 0.088  0.312 0.087  0.477 0.134  0.275  0.275  0.410  
1.39   1.52   2.09   1.68   1.68   2.57   1.85  1.86  2.86 
other -0.485 -0.138  -0.502 -0.142  -0.532 -0.154  -0.717 -0.200  -0.709 -0.198  -0.770 -0.217  -1.696  -1.704  -1.720  
-0.59   -0.59   -0.65   -1.01   -0.99   -1.10   -3.27  -3.27  -3.27 
social -0.538 -0.153  -0.545 -0.155  -0.524 -0.151  -0.054 -0.015  -0.064 -0.018  -0.044 -0.012  -0.720  -0.738  -0.705  
-1.22   -1.21   -1.17   -0.15   -0.18   -0.12   -2.49  -2.54  -2.40 
dist-hospital 0.004 0.001  0.005 0.001  0.008 0.002  0.020 0.006  0.020 0.005  0.025 0.007  -0.004  -0.004  0.000  
0.40   0.48   0.86   2.14   2.13   2.67   -0.54  -0.54  0.07 
dif-walk 0.357 0.102  0.364 0.103  0.363 0.105  0.982 0.274  0.979 0.273  0.997 0.280  0.670  0.671  0.678 
 1.83   1.83   1.87   5.23   5.19   5.20   5.23  5.21  5.27 
A17 
 
TABLE A5 (continued) 
 dependent variable = anxiety: probit  dependent variable = pain: probit  d.v. = health-score: tobit 
 A(i)  B(i)  C(i)  A(ii)  B(ii)  C(ii)  A(iii)  B(iii)  C(iii) 
 coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef. m.e.  coef.  coef.  coef. 
not-walk 0.758 0.216  0.811 0.230  0.749 0.216  1.174 0.327  1.190 0.332  1.175 0.330  1.105  1.135  1.105 
 2.53   2.67   2.52   4.21   4.29   4.19   6.23  6.42  6.20 
illness 0.679 0.193  0.680 0.193  0.661 0.191  0.578 0.161  0.577 0.161  0.564 0.159  0.949  0.953  0.934 
 3.20   3.14   3.15   3.07   3.05   3.01   6.91  6.92  6.78 
kids 0.046 0.013  0.047 0.013  0.050 0.014  0.074 0.021  0.074 0.021  0.077 0.022  -0.005  -0.005  -0.003 
 0.94   0.95   1.01   1.69   1.69   1.75   -0.17  -0.17  -0.09 
 0.606 0.172  0.623 0.177  0.607 0.175  0.460 0.128  0.461 0.129  0.476 0.134  0.345  0.349  0.367 
 6.26   6.54   6.22   4.06   4.09   4.22   5.50  5.54  6.03 
  
 
